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Abstract. The dendritic cell algorithm is an immune-inspired technique 
for processing  time-dependant data. Here we propose it as a possible so- 
lution for a robotic  classification problem. The  dendritic cell algorithm 
is implemented on  a  real  robot  and  an  investigation  is performed into 
the effects of varying  the migration threshold median  for the cell popula-  
tion. The algorithm performs  well on a classification task with very little 
tuning. Ways  of extending the implementation to allow it to be used as 
a classifier within the field of robotic  security are suggested. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Technologies  and  protocols designed  to enforce  security are  now pervasive  in 
society. Most houses now have burglar  alarms,  CCTV  is common-place in towns 
and cities and the private security industry is estimated to provide products  and 
services up to the value of £4 billion in the UK alone [1]. It is possible to group 
most existing solutions  as either ‘manned guarding’ or static-sensor networks. 
Manned  guarding  (bouncers,  private security guards  etc.)  is a popular  tech- 
nique for providing  additional security to buildings containing expensive or sen- 
sitive items. Human  security systems are difficult to pre-empt and can adapt to 
new circumstances. However, human  performance  varies  greatly and  is heavily 
reliant on rest periods. People are also susceptible  to prejudices  and preferences 
depending  on gender,  race and  age. Guarding is a potentially hazardous occu- 
pation as it places an individual  between a criminal  and their goal. 
Static sensor networks  (CCTV, standard burglar  alarms  etc.),  can be stored 
and  replayed  as  and  when  required.  They  do  not require  rest and  react  pre- 
dictably  to all situations. If damaged,  static sensors are easy to replace  and  in 
systems with centralised data storage, evidence  is not compromised.  However, 
criminals  can  plan  around  static sensors; as they can  be obscured  and  cannot 
negotiate obstacles. Static sensor  networks  cannot effectively  use  short-range 
sensor-types,  unless deployed in bottle-necks, such as entry and exit points. The 
  
 
 
limiting factor for many static sensor networks is the volume of information gen- 
erated. Very few sensors can be monitored by an individual  effectively. Tickner 
et al. estimated that the number  of feeds that a single operator can effectively 
monitor is approximately 16, with the detection rate falling from 83% for a four 
camera  system, to 64% for a 16 camera  system, [2]. 
Robotic systems have many properties to make them a useful tool for security 
applications. They have the advantages of static sensor networks and are capable 
of moving around  obstructions to gain a better line of sight. Short range sensors 
are more effective when mounted on a robot, as the sensor can be taken to the 
target. Whilst it is possible for an automated sentry to become predictable, intel- 
ligent routing  algorithms could make evasion challenging.  The key disadvantage 
of a robotic system is the volume of data. The  camera  mounted to the front of 
a robot  is likely to be even more difficult  to monitor  than a static camera,  as 
both the background, and  items of interest will be moving on the screen. This 
disadvantage could  potentially be overcome  if the robots could  autonomously 
recognise events of interest and report them to the operator. 
Artificial  immune  systems  (AIS)  have  had  numerous  successes in the field 
of anomaly  detection. A newly developed  AIS algorithm, the dendritic cell al- 
gorithm (DCA),  is a promising  technique for the processing  of time-dependant 
data [3]. The DCA is based on recent developments in immunology regarding  the 
role of dendritic cells (DCs),  as a major  control component within the immune 
system. The  DCA  is based  on an  abstraction of DC  behaviour  and  performs 
fusion of data from disparate sources. Successful applications of the DCA have 
focussed on solving intrusion detection problems  in computer  security, a field 
which shares properties with problems  in both robotics and physical security. 
The  potential  benefits  of applying  the DCA  to a robotic  security  solution 
are  numerous.   It is hoped  that the DCA  will have  a  resilience  to the noise 
associated with real-world  signals  due  to its ability to fuse information from 
disparate sources via a population of artificial cells. The aim of this investigation 
is to explore the applicability of the DCA to a robotic system. In section  2 we 
present work relevant to the areas of security robotics and the DCA. In section 
3 the implementation of a general  robotic DCA is discussed.  Section  4 outlines 
an investigation into the effects on the performance  of altering the dendritic cell 
migration threshold when applied to a trivial robotic classification problem. The 
results of this investigation are presented, analysed  and discussed in sections 4.1 
to 4.6. In section 5 conclusions are drawn about the applicability of the algorithm 
to robotic security and possible extensions of this work are outlined. 
 
 
2 Related Work 
 
2.1 Robotic Systems 
 
Developing  a robotic  system  is a demanding  task  as robust,  real-time  control 
is difficult  to achieve.  Brooks’  “subsumption architecture”  (first  proposed  in 
[4]), has  been  shown  to be  an  effective way  of designing  robotic  control  sys- 
tems  [5]. Such  architectures  rely on the development  of a family  of simplistic 
  
 
 
“behavioural modules”  that interact to produce  more  complex  behaviour.  For 
example,  the complex behaviour  of wandering  through a dynamic  environment, 
without hitting obstacles can be achieved through the interaction of two simplis- 
tic behavioural  modules. Figure 1 illustrates a simple subsumption architecture. 
The lower priority behaviour  simply moves the robot forwards at a constant ve- 
locity. In the event of a higher  priority behaviour  detecting an obstacle, it can 
subsume  the output of the low priority behaviour  and  steer the robot away or, 
in emergencies, stop. The interaction between the two modules ensures that the 
robot is always moving when possible, without hitting obstacles. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. A simple  subsumption architecture for implementing a wandering behaviour 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Autonomous Security  Systems 
 
Whilst the robotic security problem  is yet to be rigorously formalised,  an archi- 
tecture  using robots  as autonomous scouts  which report  ‘interesting’  events  to 
a human  operator has precedent [6][7][8]. Using this approach,  the robotic secu- 
rity problem can be viewed as two, well-researched  problems: path planning  and 
classification. Massios et al. [9] define patrol route  planning  as an optimisation 
problem,  minimising  the probability of missing a “relevant event”. 
The  classification problem  is the discrimination of important events from 
normal  events. The “mobile detection assessment and response system” [8] is an 
American  military project  aimed at producing  a collection of robots for interior 
and  exterior security. These  systems use basic motion-detection algorithms on 
data from an on-board  camera  [7]. The movement detection algorithm is simpli- 
fied by keeping the robot base stationary during classification. When movement 
is detected other sensors are employed in conjunction  with the camera  to assess 
if the observed  object  is human  or not. In [6], a more intelligent classification 
technique is proposed  using colour analysis  and clustering to compare  a room’s 
current state with its previously observed state. This algorithm has applications 
for identifying erroneous  objects,  e.g. unattended luggage,  and  recognising  the 
theft of objects  that were present in the test image. 
 
 
2.3 The Dendritic Cell Algorithm 
 
The  DCA was conceptualised and  developed by Greensmith et al. [10]. The  al- 
gorithm  is based  on  the behaviour  of DCs,  which  are  the antigen  presenting 
  
 
 
cells of the immune system. DCs are natural anomaly  detectors and data fusion 
agents, responsible  for controlling and directing  appropriate immune responses. 
The fusion of ‘signals’ across a population of DCs and the asynchronous correla- 
tion of signals with ‘antigen’ provides the basis of the DCA’s classification. DCs 
exist in one of three states, immature, semi-mature and mature. Immature DCs 
perform signal fusion and process antigen. Semi-mature and mature DCs present 
antigen with a context value derived from the fused signals. Antigen presented 
by semi-mature DCs are ‘normal’ and the antigen presented by mature DCs are 
‘anomalous’. The  biological theory is beyond  the scope of this paper,  but  the 
interested reader can refer to [10] and [11] for the relevant immunological details. 
A formal description of the DCA is provided  in [3]. 
The  DCA  is a population-based algorithm, with each  agent in the system 
represented as a cell. Each cell can collect data items to classify forming antigen 
for use within the DCA. The DCA used in this paper relies on a ‘3-signal’ model 
where three categories of input  signal are used to produce  three output signals. 
Signals and antigen are read into a signal matrix and antigen vectors. Antigen is 
sampled  by DCs and removed from the tissue antigen vector  and transferred to 
the DC’s own antigen  storage  facility.  Once antigen  is sampled,  the DC copies 
the values  of the tissue  signal  matrix  to its  own  signal  matrix.  These  values 
are  processed  by the DC during  the update to form cumulative output signal 
values. Equation 1 is the function used to process the signals, where o are output 
signals, S are input  signals, i is the number  of output signals, j is the number 
of input  signals and Wij  is the weight used for oi  and Sj . 
 
 
3 
oi  = 
- 
Wij Sj Vi (1) 
j=1 
 
Input  and output signals are termed after their biological counterparts: 
 
PAMPs  (S1 ):  A signature  of abnormal   behaviour  e.g.  number  of errors  per 
second. This signal is proportional to confidence of abnormality. 
Danger Signal (S2 ):  A measure  of an  attribute which  increases  in value  to 
indicate an abnormality e.g. an increase in the rate of a monitored attribute. 
Low values of this signal may not be anomalous,  giving a high value a mod- 
erate confidence of indicating abnormality. 
Safe  Signal (S3 ):  A  measure  which  increases  value  in  conjunction   with  ob- 
served normal  behaviour  e.g. a high value of S3   is generated if the standard 
deviation of a monitored attribute is low. This  is a confident indicator of 
normal,  predictable or steady-state  system  behaviour.  This  signal  is used 
to counteract the effects of PAMPs  and  danger  signals  and  is assigned  a 
negative weight in the weighted sum. 
CSM (o1 ):  The  costimulatory  signal  which  is increased  as  a  result  of high 
values of all input  signals. This value is used to limit the duration spent by 
DCs in the data sampling  stage. 
 
  
 
 
IL-10 (o2 ):  This value is increased  upon the receipt  of the safe signal alone. 
IL-12 (o3 ):  This value is increased  upon the receipt  of PAMP  and danger  sig- 
nals, and is decreased  by the safe signal. 
 
The processing of signals and antigen is distributed across the DC population 
to correlate disparate data sources to perform the classification of the algorithm. 
The  DCA  does not perform  antigen pattern matching, unlike  other AIS algo- 
rithms which perform antigen classification through analysis of the the structure 
of an antigen. Instead, the signals received by a DC during its antigen collection 
phase  are  used  to derive  an  antigen  context  which  is used  to perform  the ba- 
sis of classification. This  algorithm can be applied  to problems  where multiple 
antigens of identical structure i.e. antigens of the same type, are to be classified, 
such as the classification of anomalous  processes [12]. 
Each DC is randomly  assigned a migration  threshold value which is compared 
against the cumulative o1 value.  The  details  of the migration threshold value 
generation for this experiment can  be found  in section  4.4. If the value  of o1 
exceeds  the migration threshold, the DC  is removed  from  data sampling  and 
enters  the maturation stage.  At this  point  the values  for  output signals  o2 
and  o3  are  assessed.  If o2  > o3,  the DC  is termed  ‘semi-mature’.  Antigen 
‘presented’ by a semi-mature cell is assigned a context value of 0. Conversely,  if 
o2 < o3 the cell is termed ‘mature’ and antigen presented by this cell is assigned 
a context value of 1. Once the DC has presented its antigen-plus-context values, 
it is reset and returned to the DC population. Data sampling  by DCs continues 
for the duration of the experiment, or until a specified stopping condition is met. 
After a specified number  of antigen are  presented by  the DCs,  analysis  is 
performed.  As mentioned, antigen do not have unique values representing their 
structure, with antigen of identical values  termed as a ‘type’. The  MCAV  co- 
efficient (mature context antigen value)  is calculated as the fraction  of antigen 
presented in the mature context, per type of antigen. MCAVs close to 1 indicate 
that a type of antigen is potentially anomalous.  A threshold is applied  to the 
MCAV values to discriminate between anomalous  and normal  types of antigen. 
Thus far, the majority of problems presented to the DCA are related to com- 
puter  security,  specifically the detection of port scans  [3] it  is also applied  to 
a static machine  learning  dataset [10] and  the detection of intrusions in sensor 
networks[13]. Work  performed  by Greensmith et al. [12] has indicated that the 
DCA performs  well for time-dependent real-valued  data, such  as that seen in 
robotics applications. Following the interesting ideas proposed  in [14], it is fath- 
omable  that the DCA,  also based  on innate  immunity,  could  be incorporated 
into the field of mobile robotics. As the DCA has a history of good performance 
for illegal scan detection in computer  security, it may be a useful algorithm for 
the purpose of physical robotic security applications. 
 
 
3 The Robotic Dendritic Cell  Algorithm 
 
The DCA is applied to a general robotics problem to support the suitability of the 
algorithm for mobile robotic security. The platform used for this investigation is a 
  
 
 
Pioneer 3DX. This robotic system has a broad variety of sensors, including a laser 
range finder (LRF),  an array  of sonar sensors and a pan-tilt-zoom camera.  On- 
board  processing is performed  using an 850MHz Pentium III processor running 
Debian Linux, (kernel version 2.6.10). The manufacturer’s “Aria”  library  is used 
to control the device.  The  Aria  control system is an  object-orientated (C++) 
library which is structured to support the implementation of subsumption control 
architectures. All compilation was carried  out using g++ version 4.0.2. 
The  robotic DCA  is implemented as a stand-alone behavioural  module  for 
compatibility with a subsumption architecture. Figure  2 illustrates the archi- 
tecture which  implements a simultaneous wandering  and  DCA  classifying  be- 
haviour.  This  extension of the Aria  library’s ‘wander’ architecture has  an  ad- 
ditional  module  for image  processing  and  an  additional  module  for executing 
the DCA. By making  these additions part of the subsumption architecture, the 
fundamental behaviour  of moving around  safely within the environment can be 
prioritised above all other actions.  In addition to the wandering  and classifying 
behaviour,  there is also a tele-operation, (remotely controlling the robot from a 
networked machine) and classifying behaviour.  The DCA module outputs MCAV 
coefficients (as described  in section 2.3), approximately once per second. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. The  subsumption architecture used to implement the robotic DCA 
 
 
The DCA used on the robot is a streamlined version of the algorithm which 
does not require any additional software libraries, unlike the implementation used 
in  [12].  Verification  of the streamlined  implementation’s  functionality  against 
that of the original  DCA has been achieved.  This  was performed  by attaching 
‘virtual’ signals and antigen to the inputs  of the module and processing the data 
used in [12]. The signal weightings specified for the anomaly  detection algorithm 
in [12] were used for all experiments. 
 
 
4 Experimental  Validation 
 
It is thought that the DCA is capable  of processing  real-time  sensor data. It is 
further  hypothesised  that the migration  threshold  will have a noticeable  effect 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
on the false positive rate for this classification task. The following experiment is 
designed to test these ideas. 
 
4.1 Experimentation 
 
This  experiment uses  the “simultaneous wander  and  classify”  behaviour  dis- 
cussed in section 3. The DCA classifies its current location as either ‘anomalous’ 
or ‘normal’ from the application-specific input  signals. For this simple test, pink 
coloured objects with a height less than 330mm are considered anomalous  whilst 
other obstacles are considered to be normal.  The colour pink is used as it is eas- 
ily distinguished  from other  objects  within  the robot’s  environment.  A height 
of 330mm is used as objects  below that height are unobservable by the LRF’s 
planar  field of view (FOV),  but  can still be detected by the sonar sensors’ conic 
FOV.  This  means  objects  classified as ‘pink’, detectable by the sonar  but  not 
detectable by the laser, are classified as anomalous. 
The  starting conditions for the experiments are illustrated by figure 3. Ob- 
stacle A is a pink cylinder,  with a height less than 330mm which is an example 
of an  anomalous  object.  Obstacle  B is a pink  cylinder,  with  a height  greater 
than 330mm which  is an  example  of a normal  object.  It is expected  that the 
DCA will not react  to the taller cylinder as the algorithm will prevent full mat- 
uration of the cells. By maintaining the starting position of the robot and  the 
positions of the obstacles, it is possible to calculate the ideal classification for all 
points within the enclosure. The error between the theoretical response and the 
algorithm output can then be used as a metric  to assess the performance  of the 
algorithm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. The  starting conditions  for  each  experiment.  Cylinder A  is the  ‘dangerous’ 
obstacle, cylinder  B is the ‘safe’ obstacle. 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Signal Sources 
 
As described in section 2.3, three signals are used as inputs to the DCA inclusive 
of a safe signal, a danger signal and a PAMP  signal. The former acts to suppress 
  
 
 
the full maturation of the dendritic  cells, whilst  the other  two  stimulate  the 
maturation. All signals contribute to the migration of the cells. 
The  PAMP  is sourced  from the image  processing  module.  The  input  from 
the camera  is transferred  into  the HSV, (Hue,  Saturation,  Value)  colour space 
and  the histogram back-projection algorithm is applied  to the data [15]. The 
back-projection algorithm uses  a  single  training image  to identify the colour 
properties of an object  of interest. All pixel groups within the image that share 
the same statistical properties are identified and contours are drawn around those 
clusters. The  final output from the image processing  library  is the area  of the 
largest region which matches the properties of the test image. Intel’s “OpenCV” 
library  was used  to perform  all image processing.  The  output from the image 
processing  module  is scaled down before being used as the PAMP  signal.  The 
scaling factor  used was calculated from test data generated by a seven minute 
random  walk around  the pen. 
The LRF is used as the source for the safe signal so objects taller than 330mm 
will produce  high values of the inhibitory signal. The FOV  of the LRF  extends 
from -90◦   to +90◦   (where  0◦   is directly  in front  of the robot).  A 44◦   FOV  is 
used, ranging  from -22◦  to +22◦ . A narrow  FOV  reduces  the risk of erroneous 
classification from walls. The distance to the closest object within the safe FOV 
is returned to the signal processor. The signal processor calculates the magnitude 
of the safe signal. This is performed  using a look up table which relates distance 
to signal  strength.  For  values  that lie between  those  specified  in the look up 
table,  linear  interpolation  is used  to calculate  the signal  strength.  The  values 
used are given in Table  1. 
 
 
Table 1. Object Distance and  Signal Strength for Ranged Sensors 
 
 
Distance (mm)  Safe Signal Strength 
 
0 100 
300 90 
600 50 
900 20 
1200 0 
 
 
 
The  danger  signal is sourced  from the sonar  array  which has  a 360◦   FOV. 
The  danger  signal FOV  coincides with the safe signal FOV.  The  same look up 
table (see Table  1) used to normalise  the laser output for the safe signal is used 
to normalise  the sonar output for the danger  signal. 
 
4.3 Antigen Source 
In a practical robotic security solution,  the antigen could be a vector  based  on 
the estimated location of the anomalous  situation. Object-based approaches  for 
5I •
I
0
I
 
 
 
 
antigen generation within a robot system have been put  forward  by by Kraut- 
macher et al. in [16]. For this simple implementation antigen is an integer number 
which uniquely  identifies a segment of the test pen.  This  encapsulates a small 
range of positions and orientations of the robot. The actual  position and orienta- 
tion of the robot is estimated using a ‘dead reckoning’ algorithm. Dead reckoning 
estimates  the position  and  orientation  of the robot  from encoders  mounted  on 
the wheels, the fixed starting position of the robot and the diameter of the tyres. 
The  antigen  generated  enumerates  a 300mm grid square  within  the pen and  a 
30◦  segment within that square.  Generating antigen based  on the current loca- 
tion of the robot is more practical than object-based antigen, which requires  a 
deeper knowledge of the environment to compute. 
As the antigen is generated based  on a specific robot location, it is possible 
that an ineffective amount of antigen will be generated. One solution for this is to 
add multiple copies of each antigen to the DCA environment as suggested in [17]. 
A novel extension to the DCA for this application is an antigen multiplication 
function.  This function  adds varying  amounts of each antigen depending  on the 
speed of the robot. Areas  passed  through slowly are  made  to contribute more 
antigen than areas  passed  through quickly.  This  is done  because  areas  passed 
through quickly contribute less signal to the DCA environment, as less time is 
physically spent within that area. The weighting function is given in equation 2. 
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In equation  2 v is the velocity  of the robot,  0˙  is the rotational  velocity  of the 
robot and W is the amount of antigen added  to the environment. 
The smallest amount of antigen that can be added  is 2, when the robot is at 
maximum  velocity and maximum  rotational velocity. The maximum  amount of 
antigen that can be added  is 102, when the robot is totally stationary. 
A simple program  written in Java calculates the theoretical MCAVs for every 
antigen, from the properties of the test pen. This is an unrealistic mathematical 
model  of the experiment but  provides  a  way  of analysing  the true and  false 
positive rates for each run of the experiment. 
 
 
4.4 Experiment  Parameters 
 
Each  run  of the experiment  allowed  the robot  to wander  around  the test pen 
for ten minutes.  The classification experiment was repeated three times for each 
value of migration threshold median.  The experiments used the migration medi- 
ans 15, 30, 60, 120 and 240. The range of allowed values is ±50% of the migration 
median in each case. Each DC was assigned a random migration threshold within 
the specified range,  using an equi-probable distribution. 
A naming  convention is used  referring  to the first experiment as M15, the 
second as M30 etc. A threshold of 0.6 is applied  to the MCAV values from the 
algorithm. Values  less than or equal  to 0.6 are  counted as a negative or ‘safe’ 
classification, values above are counted as a positive or ‘dangerous’ classification. 
 
  
 
 
 
4.5 Results 
 
Figure  4 shows the false positive and false negative rates from the experiments. 
The rates are calculated by comparing  the classification from the algorithm with 
the theoretical classification. Each  point on the chart shows the misclassified 
antigen rate from the beginning  of the experiment up to the time indicated on 
the x-axis.  Each  series is the average  classification  error  from three  runs  with 
the specified migration rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. The  classification error  rates from  the experiments.  The  false  positive  rate is 
shown on the left and  the false negative  rate is shown on the right 
 
 
 
 
4.6 Analysis 
 
The  classification error  rates rise throughout the experiments. Analysis  of the 
robot’s telemetry showed that the error in localisation from the dead-reckoning 
algorithm was  drifting over  time. As the measure  used  to assess  the robot’s 
performance  relies upon the location of the robot, it is theorized that the clas- 
sification errors from the first 1-2 minutes  are closer to the “true” classification 
errors,  as they will not be as significantly affected by the localisation drift. The 
use of a theoretical model as a baseline for the experiment could also introduce 
a constant error  offset as the model may not be totally accurate. However, the 
performance  of the algorithm is still high. The highest recorded  rate of classifi- 
cation error for the entire experiment is a 0.16 false-positive rate, for the M240 
experiment. The  higher amount of antigen absorbed  before migration increases 
the occurrence  of cases when  a DC  collects  both dangerous  and  safe antigen, 
making  attributing ‘blame’  more difficult.  The  false positive  rates  all start be- 
low 0.14. M30 demonstrated the best performance  overall,  and  appears  to give 
the optimum  performance  for this particular experiment. It is intuitive to see 
higher error rates from experiment M15 as a low migration threshold will cause 
  
 
 
DC’s to migrate after only sampling a small amount of signal. This would result 
in the classifier being more prone to noise within the system. M120 has amongst 
the highest  false negative  rates  and  the lowest  false positive  rates.  More work 
will have to be done to understand why this should  be the case. One potential 
cause may  be the high range  of possible migration  thresholds  with  a tolerance 
of ±60. M60 yields the lowest false negative rate, but  one of the highest false 
positive rates. The rates of error presented in 4 are lower than expected  for this 
problem,  indicating that the DCA is suitable for some robotic applications. 
 
 
5 Conclusions 
 
The  misclassifications caused  by the dead  reckoning  errors  lead  to the results 
being  difficult  to judge  against  the chosen  metric.  This  could  be  a  problem 
for future  applications, as antigen generation for this application is intrinsically 
location specific. It is proposed that this issue could be resolved by adding a more 
advanced  localisation  algorithm  based  on using sensor readings  to compensate 
for the integration errors. 
It has been shown that it is possible to implement the DCA on a real robotic 
system. Whilst the problem  was trivial, the low false positive and false negative 
rates are promising,  especially considering that very little tuning or training has 
been performed. The implementation did not require any processing to be shared 
by another  machine,  so the DCA  is scalable  for an  n-robot  system  and  is us- 
able in circumstances when the robot enters a region with poor communications 
coverage. 
The next intended step for this project  is to apply the DCA to a harder  clas- 
sification problem  and compare  its results with a fuzzy or neural  classifier. This 
will provide  an  insight into the general  performance  of the DCA  as a robotic 
classifier. Extending this work to a security system will require  two key steps. 
Firstly the DCA will need to be modified to handle vector antigen instead of inte- 
ger antigen. This will allow a more extendible representation of the environment 
to be used  by the classifier. Secondly,  the signal sources  for a security  system 
will need to be more complex than those  used for this  experiment.  A possible 
source for the PAMP  signal would be the error from a trained, non-linear  model, 
correlating physical position to a normal  scenario.  Large error  rates would im- 
ply an anomalous  situation. The safe and danger  signals could be controlled by 
the robot’s physical location and  the time of day. It would be advantageous to 
make the robot less sensitive during  office hours  and  around  busy public areas 
and  more sensitive out  of office hours  and  around  high-security areas.  A more 
generic  anomaly  detection system  could be achieved  through  the introduction 
of a  training-data based  algorithm. The  error  rate between  what the trained 
system expects to see and what its current sensor readings  tell it, could be used 
as a source for PAMP  signals. 
Ultimately a multi-robot system, with dynamically  changing routes and shared 
anomaly  information could be developed, each using a DCA to assess the threat 
level for a given location. 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
Many  thanks to William  Wilson for his input  to the software architecture and 
to Daniel  Bardsley  for his advice  on  image  processing.  The  authors are  very 
grateful to Mark  Hammonds  for generating the vector  graphics  for this paper. 
This work is financially  supported by MobileRobots Inc. 
 
 
References 
 
1.  SIA:   The  security  industry  authority annual  report  and  accounts.  Available at 
http://www.the-sia.org.uk/ (2005-2006) 
2.  Tickner, A.H., Poulton, E.: Monitoring up to 16 synthetic television pictures show- 
ing a great deal of movement,.  Ergonomics  14(4) (1973) 
3.  Greensmith,  J., Aickelin,  U.,  Twycross, J.:  Articulation  and  clarification  of the 
dendritic cell algorithm.  In: ICARIS’06.  (2006) 
4.  Brooks, R.A.: A robust layered  control system for a mobile robot.  IEEE J. Robotics  
and  Automation (1986) 14–23 
5.  Brooks,  R.A.:   Elephants don’t play  chess.  Robotics  and  Autonomous  Systems  6 
(1990) 3–15 
6.  Castelnovi, M.,  Miozzo,  M.,  Scalzo,  A.,  Piaggio,  M.,  Sgorbissa,  A.,  Zaccaria,  R.: 
Surveillance  robotics:   analysing  scenes  by  colours  analysis  and  clustering.    In: 
CIRA.  (2003) 
7.  Everett, H., Gilbreath, G., Heath-Pastore, T., Laird,  R.: Controlling multiple secu- 
rity robots in a warehouse environment. In: AIAA/NASA Conference  on Intelligent 
Robots.  (1994) 
8.  Pastore, T.,  Everett, H., Bonner,  K.:  Mobile robots  for outdoor security applica-  
tions.  In: ANS’99. (1999) 
9.  Massios, N., Voorbraak, F.: Hierarchical decision-theoretic robotic surveillance. In: 
IJCAI’99 Workshop on Reasoning with Uncertainty in Robot  Navigation. (1999) 
10.  Greensmith,  J., Aickelin,  U.,  Cayzer,   S.:   Introducing  dendritic  cells  as  a  novel 
immune  inspired  algorithm for anomaly detection. In: ICARIS’05. (2005) 
11.  Lutz,  M.,  Schuler,  G.:   Immature, semi-mature and  fully  mature  dendritic  cells: 
which signals  induce  tolerance or immunity?  Trends in Immunology 23(9) (2002) 
12.  Greensmith, J., Twycross, J., Aickelin,  U.:  Dendritic cells for anomaly detection. 
In: Congress  on Evolutionary Computation (CEC). (2006) 
13.  J. Kim,  P. J. Bentley, C.W.M.A., Hailes, S.: Danger  is ubiquitous: Detecting mis- 
behaving nodes in sensor  networks using the dendritic cell algorithm.  In: ICARIS 
’06. (2006) 
14.  Neal,  M.,  Feyereisl,  J., Rascuna, R.,  Wang,  X.:  Don’t  touch  me,  I’m  fine: Robot 
autonomy using an artificial innate immune  system. In: ICARIS’06.  (2006) 
15.  Swain, M., Ballard, D.:  Color indexing.  International Journal of Computer Vision 
7(1)  (1991) 
16.  Krautmacher, M., Dilger, W.:  AIS based  robot  navigation in a rescue scenario.  In: 
LNCS,  Artificial Immune  Systems. (2004) 
17.  Twycross, J., Aickelin, U.: Libtissue - implementing innate immunity. In: Congress 
on Evolutionary Computation (CEC’06). (2006) 
